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#### A. Interpretation—the aff has to defend USFG action on war powers authoriy—‘resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### They aren’t a statutory restriction

KAISER 80—the Official Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress [Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the Legislative Veto; Kaiser, Frederick M., 32 Admin. L. Rev. 667 (1980)]

In addition to direct statutory overrides, there are a variety of statutory and nonstatutory techniques that have the effect of overturning rules, that prevent their enforcement, or that seriously impede or even preempt the promulgation of projected rules. For instance, a statute may alter the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency or extend the exemptions to its authority, thereby affecting existing or anticipated rules. Legislation that affects an agency's funding may be used to prevent enforcement of particular rules or to revoke funding discretion for rulemaking activity or both. Still other actions, less direct but potentially significant, are mandating agency consultation with other federal or state authorities and requiring prior congressional review of proposed rules (separate from the legislative veto sanctions). These last two provisions may change or even halt proposed rules by interjecting novel procedural requirements along with different perspectives and influences into the process.

It is also valuable to examine nonstatutory controls available to the Congress:

1. legislative, oversight, investigative, and confirmation hearings;

2. establishment of select committees and specialized subcommittees to oversee agency rulemaking and enforcement;

3. directives in committee reports, especially those accompanying legislation, authorizations, and appropriations, regarding rules or their implementation;

4. House and Senate floor statements critical of proposed, projected, or ongoing administrative action; and

5. direct contact between a congressional office and the agency or office in question.

Such mechanisms are all indirect influences; unlike statutory provisions, they are neither self-enforcing nor legally binding by themselves. Nonetheless, nonstatutory devices are more readily available and more easily effectuated than controls imposed by statute. And some observers have attributed substantial influence to nonstatutory controls in regulatory as well as other matters.3

It is impossible, in a limited space, to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive listing of congressional actions that override, have the effect of overturning, or prevent the promulgation of administrative rules. Consequently, this report concentrates upon the more direct statutory devices, although it also encompasses committee reports accompanying bills, the one nonstatutory instrument that is frequently most authoritatively connected with the final legislative product. The statutory mechanisms surveyed here cross a wide spectrum of possible congressional action:

1. single-purpose provisions to overturn or preempt a specific rule;

2. alterations in program authority that remove jurisdiction from an agency;

3. agency authorization and appropriation limitations;

4. inter-agency consultation requirements; and

5. congressional prior notification provisions.

#### Judicial relates to the judicial branch of the USFG

WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW 01 [Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/judicial.html]

Judicial

Definition - adj

[Latin judicialis, from judicium judgment, from judic- judex judge, from jus right, law + dicere to determine, say]

1 a : of or relating to a judgment, the function of judging, the administration of justice, or the judiciary

b : of, relating to, or being the branch of government that is charged with trying all cases that involve the government and with the administration of justice within its jurisdiction

compare administrative executive legislative

2 : created, ordered, or enforced by a court <a ~ foreclosure>

compare conventional legal

#### B. Our interpretation is best—

#### 1. Predictability—ignoring the resolution opens up an infinite number of topics—this undermines our ability to have in-depth research on their arguments destroying the value of debate.

#### 2. Ground—the resolution exists to create fair division of aff and neg ground—any alternative framework allows the aff to pick a moral high ground that destroys neg offense.

#### 3. Education—academics must learn to engage the public’s line of thinking—abstract moralism without addressing how to get our policies passed is useless.

Isaac 2—Jeffrey Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University [Spring 2002, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” *Dissent*, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=601]

What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left—by which I mean “progressive” faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates—has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing—about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq—continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it—about globalization and sweatshops— is new and in some ways promising (see my “Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement,” Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, **and what the likely costs**, as well as the benefits, **are of any reasonable strategy**. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic—petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of **the vast majority of Americans**, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and **who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives**. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. **It** **is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates** (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism. case in point is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: “Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law.” This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national Campus Greens, 9- 11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: “vengeance offers no relief. . . retaliation can never guarantee healing. . . and to meet violence with violence breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice.” On this view military action of any kind is figured as “aggression” or “vengeance”; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, “healing” is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response. None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response—or at least any U.S. military response—is simply defined as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of any military response. It is virtually impossible either to “apprehend” and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the “criminals” in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to “arrest” them. And, finally, while “healing” is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a political goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for “social justice abroad.” It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility—these are unmentioned. They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter—the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America’s use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare— which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation—make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation. And yet the left’s reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of “materialism” and evocations of “struggle,” especially on the part of those many who are not pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable “anti-militarism” of today’s campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not. This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post–cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post–September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it. As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of “aggression,” but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most “peace” activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: **it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals** and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### C. Voting issue—resolving the topicality is a pre-condition for debate to occur. Fairness outweighs—debate is played for its own sake—fairness outweigh all other concerns.

Villa 96—Dana Villa Political Theory @ UC Santa Barbara [*Arendt and Heidegger: the Fate of the Political* p. 37]

If political action is to be valued for its own sake, then the content of political action must be politics “in the sense that political action is talk about politics.” The circularity of this formulation, given by George Kateb, is unavoidable. It helps if we use an analogy that Kateb proposes, the analogy between such a purely political politics and a game. “A game,” writes Kateb, “is not ‘about’ anything outside itself, it is its own sufficient world…the content of any game is itself.” What matters in a game is the play itself, and the **quality of this play** is **utterly** **dependent** upon the **willingness** and ability of the **players** to **enter the “world” of the game**. The Arendtian conception of politics is one in which the spirit animating the “play” (the sharing of words and deeds) comes **before all else**—before personal concerns, groups, interests, and even moral claims. If allowed to dominate the “game,” these elements detracts from the play and from the performance of action. A good game happens only when the players submit themselves to its spirit and **do not allow subjective or external motives to dictate the play**. A good game, like genuine politics, is played for its own sake.

#### Additionally—failure to specify the restriction they put in place makes any debate over process of solvency or counterplan competition impossible.

### 1NC CP

#### The Executive branch should publicly articulate its legal rationale for its targeted killing policy, including the process and safeguards in place for target selection.

#### The CP’s the best middle ground—preserves the vital counter-terror role of targeted killings while resolving all their downsides

Byman 13—Daniel Byman is a Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution [“Why Drones Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92 Issue 4, p. 32-43, EBSCO]

Despite President Barack Obama's recent call to reduce the United States' reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration's weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.

Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries' capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid.

### 1NC DA

#### Targeted killing’s vital to counterterrorism—disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible

Anderson 13—Kenneth, Professor of International Law at American University [May 24, 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary Magazine, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548.html]

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities—but much of the drone’s contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.

Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.

If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive—including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law—then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration—and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counterinsurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature.

Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target—one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### TK is key to prevent existential terrorism

Beres 11—Louis René Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, Ph.D. from Princeton [2011, “Roundtable Discussion: Is the President Bound by International Law in the War Against Terrorism? A Ten-Year Retrospective: After Osama bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and International Law,” 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93, Lexis]

Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance of anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemption. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-enforcing behavior.

For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. Fourth, the assassination would need to be founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm [\*114] to civilian populations than would all of the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense.

Such an argument may appear manipulative and dangerous; permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the convenient pretext of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could otherwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a decentralized system of international law may sometimes still require extraordinary methods of law-enforcement. n71

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelligence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, and cost-effective.

What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear, biological or chemical weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably depends upon the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the moment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are configured.

But it is entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of preemption would generate tangibly greater harms than assassination, and possibly with no greater defensive benefit. This suggests that assassination should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under international law. [\*115]

What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states would not involve higher-order (WMD) n72 military attacks? Could assassination also represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but it is by no means an essential precondition. A conventional military attack might still, after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive. n73 Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks.

#### Response to terrorism requires sovereign killing because terrorism uses civilian deaths to end political contest—this subsumes their pre-politics argument

Michael **IGNATIEFF** Director Carr Center for Human Rights @ Harvard **‘2** “Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism” *Social Research* 69 (4) p. 1156-1157

But the test as to whether a political system meets the needs of the weak is not whether the case of the weak succeeds, but whether it can be heard and in some way accommodated. The test of whether violence is justified is also stringent: the interests in question must be serious and their denial a very basic denial of essential human rights; the failure to accommodate these interests must be repeated and must genuinely shut the door to further redress. Finally, the test of whether violent action is justified depends on whether all peaceful, deliberative courses have been genuinely exhausted and nonviolence protest has come up short on a matter, again, that involves a fundamental human right. Time and again—and the examples here are the Basque separatists, the Tamil Tigers, the Irish nationalists, and yes, the Palestinians too—violence is not resorted to as a last resort, after exhausting good faith efforts to exploit all peaceful and legitimate means of political action, including nonviolent protest, but as *a first* resort. The weak conclude: Let's go the fast way. The fast way is to kill as many civilians as possible to get the world to take notice. Let's kill as many civilians as we can to provoke the other side into a downward spiral of repression and violence that will delegitimate them in the eyes of their supporters and the world at large. This is what the French so rightly call *la politique du pire. La politique du pire* does away with the core of politics that is deliberation, the business of actually persuading other human beings that you are right and they are wrong. The horror of terrorism is that it is a politics that seeks the death of politics, a practice that wants to replace dialogue, discussion, debate, protest, and the arts by which we maintain some control over human violence with violence alone. The reason that Osama bin Laden is the enemy of the human race is not just that he cares so little about human life, but that he will not reason or argue with anyone. He is not interested in joining any argument with anyone. He would rather terrify' or intimidate. So in understanding what we do not like about terror, it is not simply that it kills human beings. It also kills politics, the one process we have devised that masters violence in the name of justice. This is what truly entitles us to say that Osama bin Laden and his like are enemies of the human race and that our relations with them should be relations of war.

#### Nuclear terrorism is feasible, a high risk, and turns the case

Dvorkin 12—Major General (retired) Vladimir Z. Dvorkin is doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences [September 21, 2012, “What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism Is a Real Threat,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html]

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.

At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.

Severe consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby. The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.

Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.

Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device. Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.

The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.

If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause violent protests in the Muslim world. Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory.

To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability. BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order. All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

#### Extinction—equivalent to full-scale nuclear war

Toon 7—Owen B. Toon, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., [April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf]

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

### Case

#### They don’t solve—the majority of drone strikes are signature strikes which are distinct from targeted killings. Means even if they oppose one, they don’t solve the other. If they do it proves our topicality arguments.

#### The phrase “SO CALLED” marks targeted killing as unexamined – it entices circumvention

RADNITZKY, BARTLEY, & POPPER 87 [Radnitzky, Gerard, William Warren Bartley, and Karl Raimund Popper, eds. Evolutionary epistemology, theory of rationality, and the sociology of knowledge. Open Court Publishing, 1987.]

A first step in approaching such questions is to notice, to begin to identify, what existing traditions and institutions already contribute to goals of eliminating error and distortion and enhancing the advance of knowledge, and which ones work against those same goals. Some apparently trivial existing institutions- some linguistic institutions, for instance — which of course were never developed for such purposes, in fact serve them rather subtly, economically, and effectively. There is, for instance, what I call “marked knowledge, which is a kind of evolutionary precursor to falsified know1edge. We often use standard qualifiers, such as the phrase “so-called”, to mark concepts or theories or practices about which there is already some doubt or question, which are not yet examined properly, or which are for the moment out of fashion. There are many such markers: others are the use of the phrase “First Draft” to mark a manuscript that is being circu lated for critical comments, or the phrase “trial balloon”, which one may use self- deprecatingly to offer a fresh but as yet unexamined idea. This sort of device should probably be used much more often: it could only do good if every published manuscript were prominently marked “Damaged Goods”. Or perhaps promoters of ideas could, in their own self-interest, stamp them: “ are not sure that it is in our interest to market these ideas or in your interest to accept them. Caveat emptor.” The use of such markers in the marketplace of ideas proclaims to others that we are savvy, critical, and aware of, or anticipate, such defects — or are at least aware that there is some question about such ideas. We use such devices to get optimum use out of such ideas: for our purpose is not to delete them too fast, not to eliminare what might be called effective knowledge before we have got as much as we can from it, but just to mark it as defective.. Such knowledge can be transmitted so marked whereas in natural selection in nature, there is only deletion (extinction).

#### Our framework is to maximize the lives saved. We should never sacrifice individuals for abstract market values – however, attempts to preserve lives gives equality to all rational beings – that’s key to value to life

Cummisky 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates College, Kantian Consequentialism, pg. 145)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more eExt.ensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake for others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value ( GMM 436)., but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapter 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support th view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, the equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

#### Impartial war decision-making should be distinct from individual morality. Evaluating likely outcomes requires some level of distance from personal opinion.

Jeffrey WHITMAN Philosophy @ Susquehanna 7 [“Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism: A Utilitarian Perspective” Public Integrity Winter 2006-2007 9 (1) p. 30-32]

One of the few writers to propose an alternative, utilitarian interpretation of just war is Richard Brandt.14 His interpretation offers a utilitarian justification for the principles that Hartle and others highlight, arguing that the human rights perspective derives from the utilitarian principle that enjoins producing the greatest good for the greatest number. This principle can be applied to all of the just war criteria outlined above,15 and particularly to the goals or purposes of just war theory from which those criteria derive. A utilitarian would endorse whatever actions are best suited to achieving the theory’s three main goals (limiting the occurrence of war, limiting the brutality of war, and limiting the likelihood of a future war once a peace is established). Determining what actions to endorse would be a matter of calculating the likely outcomes and their relationship to the goals of just war theory. Nonetheless, many argue that utilitarianism suffers from a multitude of sins and is thus an inappropriate basis for morality in general, let alone for moral judgments concerning war. For example, the coldly calculating nature of utilitarian thinking, along with its emphasis solely on the consequences of actions, tends to ignore other equally (or perhaps more important) aspects of moral value and the moral life. The lost values include certain absolutist moral principles (e.g., respect for persons as such, human rights, our moral integrity), the felt connections to friends and family that motivate much of human morality, the intentions of the moral agent despite the outcome of his or her actions, and higher, aesthetic values that may have no or minimal utility. These criticisms are important and serious criticisms of utilitarianism, but they are criticisms that seem more appropriate to utilitarianism as a personal moral code than as a moral framework for public policy. And when the subject is just war theory, especially as it concerns decisions about war made by states, the perceived weaknesses of utilitarianism as a private morality actually turn into strengths (Goodin 1995, 8–11).16 The impersonal nature of utilitarianism, while it may not be appropriate when dealing with, for example, the everyday moral dilemmas of family life, seems entirely appropriate in the public policy arena, because it guarantees a measure of impartiality. In just war theory, this impartiality seems crucial so as not to overinflate the dangers to one’s own country when contemplating resort to war, or give preference to one’s own side when applying the laws of war as they pertain to “protected persons,” just to give a few examples.17 As for the coldly calculating “sin” of utilitarianism, it becomes a virtue insofar as it enjoins public officials not to allow their hearts to rule their heads. Having attained victory in a war, a nation might issue a public outcry for onerous compensation or revenge against the former enemy. And while government officials may be sympathetic to such sentiments, they must overcome these natural feelings of the public through the application of “coldly calculating” reason if they are to attain the goal of a better state of peace, as *jus post bellum* principles dictate. Furthermore, while we may wish that officials would aim carefully at the production of public good, the results are all that we are really interested in from a public policy perspective. Motives and intentions seem superfluous. Perhaps President George H.W. Bush’s primary motive for going to war against Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War was to protect the oil interests of multinational corporations, and he and his administration had little interest in restoring the sovereignty of Kuwait. Nonetheless, the Gulf War has been largely judged to have been morally justified because it was a response to the aggression of Iraq and had the effect of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty, regardless of the Bush administration’s “real” intentions. Additionally, as this example also illustrates, what officials do in the public realm may be the product of a number of different intentions, some more noble than others. In the end, however, the only thing we can morally judge is the outcome of the policy decisions. Motivations and intentions are subject to endless speculation and may even be falsely recalled and reported. Utilitarianism operating at the public policy level recognizes this problem and correctly discounts the motives and intentions of policymakers in favor of results. So it is true that the consequentialism of utilitarianism means that the focus of decision-making is on results and not on absolutist moral principles. When it comes to public policy decisions, however, this focus seems entirely correct, rather than a weakness. In making decisions for the greater public good, officials may be morally obligated to violate seemingly inviolate moral principles and “dirty their hands.” Hard as this choice may be, it is a choice officials are expected to make. “Doing right though the heavens may fall is not (nowadays anyway) a particularly attractive posture for public officials to adopt” (Goodin 1995, 10). Even Walzer (2000), a strong advocate of a human rights perspective on just war theory, recognizes that there may be instances in war (what he labels a “supreme emergency”) where the rights of innocent people may be violated in the service of the public good (chap. 16).18 Finally, the criticism that utility, understood as the balance of pleasure over pain, is too crass a value to promote, and that it diminishes other, higher, aesthetic and moral values also seems to miss the point when it come to public policy decisions. It is true that one’s private life may be impoverished if these values are ignored, but in making public policy, the morally correct question should be what useit is to the overall public good. For some, such decisions may seem insensitive, but they are nonetheless morally appropriate. This sentiment is especially true in time of war. As Robert Goodin (1995) notes (metaphorically speaking), “Rulers have no right to wage holy wars—anyway, not ones waged on behalf of gods in whom their subjects no longer have any faith” (p. 11).

#### Drones don’t desensitize us to death—they have no alternative and its historically inaccurate

Anderson 13—Kenneth, Professor of International Law at American University [May 24, 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary Magazine, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548.html]

The most offensively foolish (though endlessly repeated) objection raised against drones was the one made by Jane Mayer in her influential 2009 New Yorker article, “The Predator War”: that drone pilots are so distant from their targets that they encourage a “push-button,” video-game mentality toward killing. The professional military find the claim bizarre, and it fails to take into account the other kinds of weapons and platforms in use. Note, the pilot of a manned craft is often thousands of feet away and a mile above a target looking at a tiny coordinates screen. And what of the sailor, deep in the below-decks of a ship, or a submarine, firing a cruise missile with no awareness of any kind about the target hundreds of miles away?

For that matter, the common perception of drones as a sci-fi combination of total surveillance and complete discretion in where and when to strike is simply wrong. The drone pilot might sit in Nevada, but the drone itself has a limited range, requires an airstrip, fuel, repairs, and 200 or so personnel to keep it in the air. All this physical infrastructure must be close to the theater of operations. Stress rates among drone pilots are at least as high as those of manned aircraft pilots; they are far from having a desensitized attitude toward killing. This appears to be partially because these are not mere combat operations but fundamentally and primarily intelligence operations. Drone pilots engaged in targeted killing operations watch their targets from a very personal distance via sensor technology, through which they track intimate, daily patterns of life to gather information and, perhaps, to determine precisely the best moment to strike, when collateral damage might be least.

As one drone operator told me, it is not as if one sees the terrible things the target is engaged in doing that made him a target in the first place; instead, it feels, after a few weeks of observation, as though you are killing your neighbor.

In any case, the mentality of drone pilots in targeted-killing ops is irrelevant to firing decisions; they do not make decisions to fire weapons. The very existence of a remote platform, one with long loiter times and maximum tactical surveillance, enables decisions to fire by committee. And deliberately so, notes Gregory McNeal, a professor of law at Pepperdine University, who has put together the most complete study of the still largely secret decision-making process—the so-called disposition lists and kill matrix the New York Times has described in front page stories. It starts from the assessment of intelligence through meetings in which determinations, including layers of legal review, are made about whether a potential target has sufficient value and, finally, whether and when to fire the weapon in real time. The drone pilot is just a pilot.

Targeting is therefore a bureaucratized process that necessarily relies on judgment and estimations of many uncertainties. Its discretionary and bloodless nature alarms critics, as does its bureaucratic regularization. Yet it is essential to understand, as McNeal observes, that this is not fundamentally different from any other process of targeting that takes place in conventional war, save that it seeks to pinpoint the targets. Conventional war targeting, by contrast, seeks not individuals, but merely formations of hostile forces as groups. In either case, targeting is inherently intelligence-driven and a highly organized activity, whether in the military or across the broader national-security agencies.

Concerns about the nature of the warfare itself leads to a sharing and checking of that discretion among actors; in turn, this leads to committees’ making decisions; and by the time this process of bureaucratic rationalization is complete, it looks like military targeting processes in conventional war, with an extra dollop of intelligence assessments, not some mysterious Star Chamber assassination committee. After all, any group of generals deciding where to hit the enemy in war is, by definition, a “kill list” committee.

#### Drones don’t create distancing effects – their account agency is backwards so living in truth can’t solve.

Caroline HOLMQVIST Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies @ LSE and Senior Lecturer @ Swedish National Defence College 13 Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare *Millennium* 41 (3) p.541-543 [gender modified]

Automated War – Virtual yet Humanly Experienced

An intuitive response to news about the increased reliance on technologies that allow for ‘killing at distance’ is that it renders war ‘virtual’ for one side of the conflict. This view follows from discussions of air power in war more generally, as we saw in the wake of NATO’s bombardment of Kosovo in 1999.22 The drone operator, sitting in the safety and comfort of his control room in Nevada, no longer experiences war, goes the argument, and killing as a result becomes casual.23 Shielded from physical harm, the drone operator is no longer part of the fight in an existential sense; there is no risk to his [or her] life. No doubt, drone warfare is infinitely more real for the populations amongst whom attacks take place, who risk being killed, losing loved ones or having their homes destroyed. Yet, while such arguments have understandable appeal, close study of drone operators’ activity yields a more complicated picture. Derek Gregory’s study of drone operators’ experience focuses on the ‘scopic regime’ that enables drone warfare in the first place and closely examines the different types of vision and imaging that drone operators are exposed to, from wide area airborne surveillance to the macro-field of micro-vision.24 These visibilities are conditional and conditioning because they are not merely technical feats but ‘techno-cultural accomplishments’.25 Rather than any straightforward abstracting of war into a video game, the abstracting that takes place is convoluted and paradoxical. Contrary to common perception, drone warfare is ‘real’ also for those staring at a screen and, as such, the reference to video games is often simplistic. It is the immersive quality of video games, their power to draw players into their virtual worlds, that make them potent – this is precisely why they are used in pre-deployment training.26 The video streams from the UAV are shown to have the same immersive quality on the drone operator – they produce the same ‘reality-effect’. Virtual war, it seems, is less virtual than would appear at first glance. This conclusion is strengthened by the growing realisation that drone operators suffer as high, and possibly higher, rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as soldiers engaged in battle as a result of exposure to high-resolution images of killing, including the details of casualties and body parts that would never be possible to capture with the human eye.27 In other words, drone operators see more than soldiers in theatre. This is not to imply any trivialising parallels between operating drones from afar and physical engagement in battle, however. The view of the ‘hunter-killer’ is, in Gregory’s words, still privileged as the drone operator empathises with his fellow comrades on the ground in Afghanistan and feels compelled to ‘protect’ and ‘help’ them by instructing to shoot.28 Ultimately, the ‘drone stare’ still furthers the subjugation of those marked as Other.29 What is of interest to us in examining the interaction of the virtual, material and human here, however, is that this occurs not through the experience (on the part of the drone operator) of distance, remoteness or detachment, but rather through the ‘sense of proximity’ to ground troops inculcated by the video feeds from the aerial platforms.30 The relationship between the fleshy body of the drone operator and the steely body of the drone and its ever-more sophisticated optical systems needs to be conceptualised in a way that allows for such paradoxes to be made intelligible. Moreover, there is clearly a need to think of the study of the experience of war in new ways: if drone operators are not as shielded from the realities of war as is generally assumed, what might they be bringing into the wider communities of which they are part? To what extent are their experiences theirs alone, and to what extent do we see them seeping out in a wider social corpus? In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, can we see the body (of the drone operator) ‘literally incarnating’ material capacities for agency, and thereby affecting the political disposition of a wider community?31 It is well established that soldiers returning from service run a higher risk of committing domestic violence, and the US military has an established programme for combating domestic violence.32 The high rate of PTSD amongst drone operators points to the need for follow-up studies of how these individuals behave in their home communities. By extension, this suggests that those interested in the experience of war need to include consideration also of the experience of – in this case – Nevada communities amidst which drone operators live. What such studies might yield we can only guess; yet it seems reasonable to suspect that the complex assemblage of virtual and material experiences that drone warfare produces might have its very own repercussions for processes and dynamics of societal militarisation and other manifestations of members’ violent experiences set in motion by, but far exceeding, war itself. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the human body is not separate from things, matter or representation; rather, ‘the flesh (of the world or my own) is … a texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself’.33 Human bodies are ‘beings-in-the-world’,34 and the material ‘reality’ of robotic warfare, like the flesh of human bodies, is irredeemably generative. The following section will expand on how.

#### Distancing isn’t the internal link to atrocity—they are historically inaccurate

Ken BOOTH IR @ Aberystwyth 7 [Theory of World Security p. 120-122]

One of the dangers I want to warn against in this discussion is of flawed reasoning about the past and its embedding into regressive myths." Giving in to such dangers will obscure the real achievements of human society, and in so doing will contribute to subverting a politics of hope - an essential collective resource.62 With this in mind, a defence of progress must engage with the myth that elides Enlightenment and totalitarianism. One place to start is the influential attack made on the Enlightenment's ostensible dark side from the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who in the late 1980s equated the Holocaust with modernity: 'The Holocaust was born and executed in our modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilization and at the peak of human cultural achievement, and for this reason it is a Problem of that society, civilization and culture.'63 Bauman went on to interpret the mass slaughter of Jews by Nazi Germany not as a shocking event completely alien to the sensibility of the Enlightenment, but as an integral part of it. His argument was that key features of what he described (vaguely) as 'modernity' were essential to the Holocaust. In Nazi Germany, reason and rationality combined with bureaucratic record-keeping and modern technology to construct the bureaucratisa- tion of mass murder. History records that politically or racially motivated slaughter, regardless of the perpetrator, is committed with the technology at hand. So it was with the ethnic cleansing of the '500 nations' on the western frontier by the US cavalry and their repeating rifles in the nineteenth century; and so it was, more recently, in the genocidal attacks on the Tut- sis in Rwanda in 1994 by the machetes of the genocidairesY4 The Nazis also used what was at hand. At the beginning of the Second World War Jews were massacred in pre-industrial ways, as in Kovno at the end of June 1941, where thousands were beaten to death," here and elsewhere, racist killing took place in ways that were neither bureaucratic nor technological." Before 1939 exile had been the chosen way of dealing with 'the Jewish problem', not extermination ,ó> Even when the system of death-camps was functioning at the maximum, the tour- denng of Jews continued by other means. Bureaucratic and industrial slaughter were not necessary features of genocide under what is called 'modernity', though the\ did become emblematic. Other genocides have not conformed to Nazi industrial modalities, and they are unlikely to. Historical specifics are crucial to such behaviour. 68 The role of anti-Semitism in German history was central to what happened. Bauman's thesis shifted the blame for the increasingly shameful treatment of the Jews (and other victims of the camps) away from the focus on Nazi racist ideology and the history of anti-Semitism in Germany, to a general criticism of the problems of rational modern society. His book was well received in Germany when it first came out, in con- trast to that by Daniel Jonah Goidhagen. Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinor. G. and the Holocaust` was not a title to win friends in Germany, however much the country had char aed over the half-century since the l9iJs/40s. What the Willing Exec did importantly insist upon was the centrality in any account of the lolocaust of giving due weight to historical specifics, particularly the strength of anti-Semitism in Germany and the unfolding momentum of events after 1933. In the interwar years, according to Goldhagen, 'the German people were more dangerously oriented towards Jews than they had been during any other time since the dawn of modernity', and this fed 'eliminationist antisemitism'/0 If the soil for the brutal treatment of the Jews was fer-' tile, the extent to which eliminationist views were able to grow has to be understood in relation to the momentum of events, and especially the course of the war. Once war had broken out, in 1939, the earlier policies adopted by the Nazis for dealing with their Jewish problem -- notably their expulsion from the Reich were no longer possible. A different solution had to be found, and possibilities opened up after 1941, when total victory over the Soviet Union appeared likely, and created the space to conceive the final solution. 71 To emphasise historical specificity (in the manner of the historian Goidhagen) rather than sweeping explanations such as 'modernity' (in the manner of the sociologist Bauman) inevitably draws attention to the site of the Holocaust, Nazi Germany. No false conclusions should be drawn from this about 'Germans', however. Prime, Levi, with the authority of the victim, made this point, arguing that the historical speci- ficity of the Holocaust should never become an excuse to stereotype all Germans or all German history72 It was certainly not the case that all Germans, nor all those from other nations living in Nazi-dominated Europe, became clones of Adolf Eichmann, despite the pressures to conform. The names of Oskar Schindler, Raoul Wallenberg, and Mies Giep are famous among those recognised as Righteous 'Among the Nations' in Yad Vashem, the Holocaust museum in Jerusalem. Thou- sands of other rescuers, not remembered, 'did what we had to do' as one said.73 Among political communities under Nazi domination dur- ing the Second World War, Bulgaria was notable for its efforts to resist the deportation of its Jews. In June 1943 the German Ambassador to Sofia (Adolf-I-leinz Beckerle) lamented that the Bulgarian people 'lacked the ideological enlightenment that we have', and that the Bulgarian man in the street 'does not see in the Jews any flaws justifying taking spe- cial measures against them'. When Beckerle was on trial in 1948 for wartime crimes, the defence lawyers noted that in Bulgaria there was no anti-Semitism in the conventional sense of the word' In pointing Security, emancipation, community out the historical specificity of the Bulgarian rescuers, these German jurists were inadvertently underlining the historical specificity of the Nazi perpetrators The intoxicating brew of Teutonic romanticism and racism in Nazi ideology as it developed in the interwar years sought to abolish the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality, and solidarity. The persecution and attempted destruction of the Jews (and other targets) represented a complete rejection of the Enlightenment's spirit of tolerance, rights, and democracy. The emancipation of Jews had been an important manifesta- tion of enlightened politics in the nineteenth century, with anti-Semitism being what Bronner called 'the philosophy of those who choose to think with their gut'. Such bigotry always stood, he said, in 'inverse relation to the support for Enlightenment ideals' .75 Nazi propaganda played on medieval (pre-Enlightenment) mythology, while from the beginning their politics and laws - contrary to Enlightenment sensibility - crushed tolerance and embedded racial discrimination. It is therefore difficult to understand why, in trying to explain the Holocaust, Enlightenment critics give such priority to the Nazi culture of bureaucratic efficiency (involving practices more or less shared with other industrialised states) as opposed to the Nazi negation of the Enlightenment's core values (which it shared only with other fascist regimes). The argument that the Holocaust was a 'legitimate resident' in the 'house of modernity', as Bauman claimed, is as flawed as it has been influential .7' The most one can say in defence of Bauman's thesis is that if 'modernity' was doing any work at all as an explanatory factor, its impact was very uneven. Given the universal horror (with the exception of those belonging to the disagreeable rump of Holocaust deniers) that greeted, and con- tinues to greet, the emblematic image of Auschwitz, it is fanciful of sociologists such as Bauman to regard the Holocaust a 'legitimate resident' of the house of modernity. If it was so, how is its uniqueness to be explained? Why have other societies, fellow residents in the house of modernity, resisted engineering industrial-scale genocide against despised minorities? Why have they instead committed themselves to the promotion of human rights (if not always consistently their practice)?

#### Drones won’t decrease barriers to use of force

Anderson 13—Kenneth, Professor of International Law at American University [May 24, 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary Magazine, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548.html]

Finally, drone warfare is often objected to on the premise that the reduced risks to one’s own soldiers might tempt political leaders to resort to force more than they should. As a moral objection, however, this is simply wrong. It is probably true that drone warfare makes it easier to use force—though the proposition that it is “too easy” depends entirely on whether one sees any particular use of force as just or unjust. While many assume that the use of force needs to be made more difficult, in the case of humanitarian intervention, where NATO countries are loath to risk their forces, one might say it is exactly the other way around.

In any case, it is an immoral argument that posits soldiers as mere means to pressure political leadership. Soldiers take risks against the enemy for reasons of military necessity. But they don’t exist to put pressure on their own political leaders. That would be to use them as hostages.

It is a most remarkable state of affairs, however, that advocacy and campaigning groups—dedicated over the decades to demanding that war’s risks to civilians be reduced—have so thoroughly bought into an argument that the fundamental problem of drones is that they threaten to make war less harmful to civilians as well as soldiers.

#### External repression is the most common way terrorist groups end—to defeat al-Qa`ida, we must continue external military and police pressure

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Yet are these figures irrelevant if the causes for which the terrorist group struggles persist? The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, for example, may have been beaten back by the authorities, but it was replaced by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which, in turn, gave rise to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[6] According to Rapoport, these causes have come in a series of distinct “waves.” Since the advent of modern terrorism during the last third of the 19th century, he believes there have been four such waves. Anarchism was the dominant cause of the first. The pursuit of national independence defined the second, while left-wing revolutionary objectives of the 1960s and 1970s characterized the third. The world now faces a fourth wave whose leitmotif is religious revivalism, Islamism especially.[7] Each of the previous three waves lasted about a generation, or 30-40 years, before receding. If this is true, is there any evidence to suggest the current wave of terrorism will last longer? This article addresses that question, first by calculating frequencies of how past terrorist groups have ended, and then examining whether al-Qa`ida-related terrorism is a unique phenomenon in the history of terrorism.

How Terrorist Groups End

How have terrorist groups ended in the past? Observers have tended to stress four general causes: external repression, internal collapse, public rejection and success. With the exception of the latter, these causes are not mutually exclusive. One cause may, in reality, reinforce the other.

Through the work of Audrey Cronin, along with the authors’ own categories, it is possible to calculate the frequencies of how terrorist groups end, as seen in Table 1.

Table 1. How Terrorist Groups End.[8]

As depicted in Table 1, terrorist groups rarely achieve their goals. For instance, none of the “urban guerrilla” groups active in Europe and Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s succeeded in igniting a revolution. None of the Palestinian groups, secular or religious (Fatah or Hamas), have achieved their ultimate aim of destroying Israel.[9]

Some groups have achieved their tactical goals. In Lebanon, Hizb Allah’s precursors managed to persuade France and the United States to withdraw their forces from Beirut following a series of suicide bombings in 1983. About the same might be said in connection with Israel’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000. Although there are a handful of exceptions, the use of terrorism is not a successful means to achieve long-term goals.

Since failure is the most common result for terrorist groups, what are the alternatives their leaders confront once they realize this probability? One option is to abandon the gun for the ballot box. In some cases—such as the IRA and the Muslim Brotherhood—leaders make a “strategic decision” to enter negotiations with their adversaries and enter or re-enter the political arena. Rarer still are groups that manage to escalate their violence from terrorism to full-scale internal warfare. In Vietnam, the Viet Cong managed to transform their insurgency along these lines.

A number of variables measure the impact of internal group dynamics and terrorism’s reception by the public. If taken together, the internal fragmentation of terrorist groups and their inability to pass their dreams to a new generation(s) of militants account for a relatively small number of outcomes. The same observation applies in the case of the groups’ external environment. The loss of state support, as Libya used to provide, has rarely caused groups to end their careers. When a state ends support for a terrorist group, other sources of funding are pursued, such as private philanthropy and bank robbery. On a few occasions, public disapproval plays a significant role in ending the use of terrorist violence—such as with the Egyptian Islamic Group following its bloody attack on tourists in Luxor.[10] Nevertheless, at least in the short-run public opinion does not make a major contribution in the abandonment of terrorism. Terrorist groups are often able to insulate themselves from external realities, particularly if they regard themselves as acting in the name of God.

The most common single explanations for the end of terrorist group activity are repression by the authorities (military or police) and the arrest or killing of a group’s leaders and top echelon. “Targeted killings,” by the Israeli government for example, or the arrest of such key terrorist luminaries as Abimael Guzman in Peru and Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey, have been criticized on the grounds that they only infuriate a group’s members and cause them to escalate violence. Yet, there should be a distinction between motivation and capacity. The desire to raise the level of terrorism may increase in these instances, but the ability to do so declines. Terrorist groups are rarely democratic organizations. New leaders may not possess the skills or allure of their predecessors—as followers of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq and Chechen followers of Shamil Basayev discovered. Although arresting a key figure is preferred, it is not always a possible outcome, especially when the individual prefers to die rather than surrender, or where the terrain is inaccessible to conventional law enforcement operations.

Repression certainly has its critics as well. In democracies, critics frequently object to repressive tactics on the grounds that they violate important constitutional safeguards both at home and abroad. Other critics stress the self-defeating nature of repression. Overly indiscriminate acts of repression by the police or military, especially foreign forces, act as recruiting tools for terrorists. This appears to be true in some cases, such as for Palestinian militant groups, but not others, such as the Tupamaros in Uruguay.[11] In any event, repression is a common way by which terrorist groups come to an end.

Is Al-Qa`ida-led Terrorism Unique Historically?

There are three reasons why al-Qa`ida-led terrorism might differ from previous trends. First, unlike previous waves, the current one is to a large extent driven by religion. Religious beliefs often have the power to elicit powerful emotions usually unavailable to such secular causes as Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Second, al-Qa`ida and its various components are part of a broad social and political Islamist movement, not an isolated band of fanatics detached physically and emotionally from the rest of society. Third, today’s religious terrorists have access to the internet. No previous generation of terrorist groups had this tool available to publicize their perspectives to an attentive public, recruit followers and communicate with adherents on a worldwide basis.

These seem like exceptionally powerful factors. Yet there is another side to consider. Periods of intense religious excitement have come and gone over the centuries. During the 1880s, for example, a mahdi appeared in Sudan whose goals and those of his followers were to eliminate all Western influence from Muslim society.[12] Among East European Jews during the 18th century, Shabbetai Zevi was believed by his thousands of followers to be the messiah to lead the children of Israel back to the “Promised Land.”[13] Over the course of its history, the United States has been the locale for multiple “Great Awakenings.”[14] In all three instances, these periods of religious excitement eventually dissipated.

The fact that al-Qa`ida is embedded in a broad movement does not make it immune to decline and defeat either. Mass protest movements typically have a beginning, middle and end. According to many of their observers, protest movements end when their “opportunity structure” narrows—that is, when the authorities become more effective in dealing with them and when the movements themselves become institutionalized as their leaders transform them into largely conventional political parties or similar organizations.[15] The history of the Palestinian group Fatah could serve as an example, or the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt where they are now represented in their countries’ parliaments.

Another powerful factor possibly affecting longevity today is the impact of the internet. On the other hand, both Europe and North America abound with far right, racist and anti-Semitic groups that make extensive use of the internet in the hope of setting off a racial holy war and, in their minds, save the Aryan race from extinction. Yet despite a myriad of websites and chat rooms, no right-wing holy war appears imminent. In the absence of a critical mass of followers, the effect of the internet is distinctly limited and is a tool rather than a cause.

The Future of Al-Qa`ida?

When assessing the future of al-Qa`ida, no single factor seems likely to bring about its demise. It will likely take a combination of the items mentioned above. There are, however, some favorable signs. According to public opinion polls conducted by Pew and Gallup, al-Qa`ida enjoys declining levels of support among sampled respondents in the Middle East and South Asia, in Pakistan especially. Leading clerics have begun to preach that al-Qa`ida’s indiscriminate attacks against civilians, Muslims in particular, conflict with the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Leadership decapitations appear to have had some effect, rhetoric aside, in demoralizing key figures. Most of al-Qa`ida’s “nodes” in Southeast Asia, for example, have been eliminated.

None of al-Qa`ida’s ostensible goals have been achieved. Governments in Cairo, Riyadh and Amman continue to function. Jews and “Crusaders” are still present in the Middle East and elsewhere in the House of Islam. The prospects of al-Qa`ida creating a new caliphate remain in the realm of the fantastic. In short, while the end may not be near, it might not be far off either.

As a result, while no “silver bullet” will bring an end to al-Qa`ida, a combination of external pressure exerted by the relevant authorities and internal decay brought on by organizational woes should reduce the threat to a manageable level.[16] What particular mix of “carrots” and “sticks” is most effective is likely to vary with the different national contexts in which the various al-Qa`ida components operate. As various U.S. political leaders have pointed out, the world is simply not going to move in the direction al-Qa`ida’s luminaries wish to take it.

#### Targeted killings reduce the efficacy of attacks and overall professionalism of terrorist organizations—prefer ev which empirically compares different types of violence

Wilner 10—Alex S. Wilner is a post-doctoral fellow with the Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellowship for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) and a visiting scholar with the Center for Security Studies, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and the RAND Corporation [“Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 33, Issue 4, 2010, Taylor & Francis, Accessed through Emory Libraries]

Like the Taliban's Shura Council, these fugitives have been targeted repeatedly. Open sources suggest that Siraj Haqqani and Qari Baryal survived targeted attacks; Mohammad Rahim, Amin al-Haq, Anwar ul-Haq, and Mullah Sadiq were captured; and Baitullah Mehsud, Tahir Yuldash, Abu Laith al-Libi and Darim Sedgai were killed. 72 These successes have communicated the Coalition's willingness, capability, and “intelligence dominance” to target, kill, and capture terrorist leaders active in Afghanistan with near impunity. The assumption driving the Afghan campaign is twofold: (i) a sustained attack on the operational leadership of the Taliban and associated groups eliminates the functional echelons of the insurgency, disrupts day-to-day planning, and diminishes coercive capabilities and levels of violence; and (ii) eliminating leaders and operators challenges the organizations’ existing cost-benefit calculations and influences individual and group behavior accordingly by increasing the cost of participating in violence. The first assumption speaks to the counter-capability notion of targeted killings while the second relates to the logic inherent to deterrence theory.

What follows is a measurement of both. The underlining methodological assumption is that a with-in and cross-case comparison of various Afghan targeted killings will reveal behavioral patterns on the part of the Taliban that ultimately informs and tests particular aspects outlined in both the targeted killing and deterrence literature. Four cases of targeted killings from the Afghan theater are analyzed; Mullah Dadullah (killed 12 May 2007), Mullah Mahmud Baluch (killed 9 June 2007), Qari Faiz Mohammad (killed 23 July 2007), and Mullah Abdul Matin (killed 18 February 2008). Data on Taliban behavior were collected and meticulously tabulated by relying on both publicly available documents (from NATO, various governments, and media sources) and “semi”-private security assessments and “daily situation/intelligence reports” compiled by private security firms (Strategic Security Solutions International (SSSI), Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), and GardaWorld). 73 With these sources, every act of violence in the weeks before and after each of the four targeted killings was compiled in a dataset. Violence was organized by day and location. A great number of behavioral variables were measured, including: the type of violence organized (from kidnappings and beheadings to vehicle-borne suicide bombings); the intended target of each attack (from civilians to coalition forces); the outcome of the attack (from failure to success and death/injury ratios); and the number of casualties (from insurgent to security personnel).

With the dataset, two sets of comparisons were made. The first was a with-in case comparison. Using a before–after approach, each targeted killing was divided into two halves: the period before and the period after the elimination. Each half represented either a two or three week period, depending on the importance of the individual eliminated (the higher the rank, the longer the timeframe). In essence, the eliminations introduced a break (or control) on the longitudinal behavior of the Taliban. In so doing, behavioral changes, attributable to the targeted killing, could be measured in the period following each strike. Importantly, using the before–after approach allowed for the creation of most-similar cases for comparison. That is, each half-case resembles the other in all (or most) ways but one—the elimination of a leader. Changes in violent behavior, then, could be safely attributed to the targeted killing. The second comparison was a cross-case assessment of each targeted killing. An intra-national investigation (comparing Afghan targeted killings), as opposed to inter-national investigation (comparing Afghan to Iraqi eliminations, for instance), was used in order to further control for sociopolitical variation within the analysis. By limiting the research to Afghanistan alone, national characteristics helped standardize the cases. Both the within-in and cross-case evaluations relied on congruence methods, which mapped out how similar the investigative outcome was to theoretical expectations, and process tracing, which assessed the causal significance of congruent findings by locating the causal pathways that exist between the independent and dependent variables.

Finally, two behavioral characteristics were measured in particular: (i) the overall professionalism of the organization (i.e., success rates vs. failure rates vs. foiled rates, along with changes in kill ratios); and (ii) the type and/or nature of attacks carried out by the group (i.e., level of sophistication (small arms fire vs. complex suicide bombings) and target selection (soft vs. hard)). Changes in Taliban professionalism in the period after the eliminations would suggest that the targeted strikes diminished the organization's coercive capability. Shifts in the nature, sophistication, and type of Taliban attack, on the other hand, would suggest that the targeted killings influenced the motivation and behavior of surviving forces. A number of particularly interesting findings are presented below.

Generally, overall violence increased following the targeted eliminations (Figure 2). This was especially so with the Dadullah case. On the surface, these are unanticipated developments. 74 The literature on targeted killings suggests that eliminations should result in a general diminishment of violence. In their quantitative analysis of Israel's campaign of targeted killings between 2000 and 2004, Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield provide similar findings. They conclude that “targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian violence.” 75 That both this and the Hafez/Hatfield study find trends that contradict theoretical expectations would suggest that certain components of the literature on targeted killings need to be substantially revised. However, a closer examination of the Afghan data does corroborate the literature's most basic theoretical principle: targeted killings influence the type of violence terrorists are capable of planning effectively and forces them to conduct less-preferred forms of activity.

Violent, non-state organizations have coercive preferences. The Taliban is no exception. The type of violence they engage in rests as much on the impact they are trying to have as it does on their capacity and capability to muster efforts toward particular goals. To that end, suicide attacks are the Taliban's preferred tactic—they are the most effective form of violence, provide the greatest consequence (both in kill ratios and psychological effect), can be directed against hard targets, are difficult to detect, stop, and mitigate, and have a proven track record of killing Coalition and Afghan soldiers. Suicide bombings are also the most sophisticated type of violence to plan, the most difficult to organize effectively, and take a considerable amount of time, energy, and expertise to mount successfully. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are the Taliban's second most preferred tactic—they have proven deadly against Afghan National Police (ANP) and other lightly armored ISAF/NATO and Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel carriers, they are cheaply constructed, and provide a deadly concentrated explosive blast. IEDs are also less sophisticated than suicide bombs and are easier to organize effectively. They offer less control, however, cannot be consistently directed against particular targets, can be detected and diffused more easily than suicide bombs, their detonation can be mitigated with proper armor, and they are all too often triggered by civilians. Small arms and rocket fire (SA/R) is the Taliban's least preferred tactic—it is most effective against soft targets, Afghan and international officials, lightly armed ANP forces, and when used in complex ambushes. However, SA/R attacks against security forces can be easily mitigated and usually result in a disproportionately high rate of Taliban casualties. Likewise, Taliban SA/R attacks are usually successfully repelled and the heavy concentration of gunmen in one location can be easily attacked with aerial support. Furthermore, Taliban rocket fire is crude, uncontrolled, and ineffective. In sum, SA/R attacks are the least sophisticated type of violence and the easiest to organize yet provide the worst results.

With these Taliban preferences in mind, the aggregate data on overall levels of violence reveal a number of expected findings. After the targeted killings, for instance, suicide bombings dropped by over 30 percent, from a total of 43 before, to 29 after, the targeted eliminations. This is in keeping with the degree of difficulty, amount of time and expertise, and level of leadership that is required to coordinate effective suicide bombings. It is also plausible that the decrease in suicide attacks spurred a rise in less-sophisticated forms of violence, with IEDs increasing by 6 percent and SA/R attacks by roughly 15 percent following the four targeted attacks. 76 As leaders and facilitators were eliminated, the Taliban began using less-sophisticated forms of violence that required less energy, expertise, and time to organize effectively. This shift resonates with elements outlined in the literature on targeted killings: as organizations succumb to the effects of a protracted campaign of elimination, their overall ability to operate at a high level of sophistication decreases and the selection and use of less formidable forms of violence increases///

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Overall levels of violence, however, are only a minor part of the analysis. The data also reveal changes in Taliban professionalism following the targeted killings. For the two most sophisticated forms of violence (IEDs and suicide attacks), the aggregate data suggest a decrease in professionalism and an increase in failure rates. After the eliminations, IED failure rates rose precipitously from 20 to roughly 35 percent. This is a considerable change in proficiency. Suicide bombing success rates also dropped (by a less impressive though no less important five percentage points) following the strikes. Both are theoretically expected findings (Figure 3). Finally, the data also suggest that the targeted killings influenced the selection of targets. For instance, in terms of known target selection for suicide bombers, the aggregate data reveal that following the eliminations, soft targets were more often selected (as a percentage of all target selection) after the leadership strikes (Figure 4). As leaders where killed, remaining forces selected less formidable targets to attack, like Afghan government officials, civil-society actors, and off-duty police commanders, rather than hardened, military actors.

Target selection of small arms fire taken from the Dadullah case in particular illustrates a similar shift in target selection: SA/R attacks against Afghan National Police forces jumped from 24 percent of total recorded attacks before Dadullah's elimination, to roughly 40 percent afterward (Figure 5). Part of the reason may rest with the fact that of all armed groups working in Afghanistan, ANP forces are the easiest to attack successfully. Although armed and numbering in the tens of thousands, ANP forces lack the sophistication and training to properly contend with heavily armed insurgents. What is more, lightly manned and far-flung ANP checkpoints dot the Afghan landscape and offer a fixed (and under-protected) position for Taliban fire. For militants, attacking the ANP is easy to do and allows them to reaffirm their continued antagonism against the GoA and ISAF while suffering fewer losses. This would have been a particularly important message to demonstrate after their fiercest leader was slain.

Accordingly, accurately interpreting success rates requires a better appreciation for what type of actor is targeted specifically and with what particular form of violence. As a general rule, the softer the target the more success a group is likely to have. Following Dadullah's elimination, for example, more suicide attacks took place after his death than before, and their overall success rate seemed to augment considerably. Before his death, over half of all suicide attacks failed, while after his elimination, only one-third did (see Figure 6). On the surface, this is a momentous increase in professionalism and might lead one to conclude that Dadullah's removal had a positive rather than negative effect on suicide bombing rates and successes. What these figures fail to reveal, however, is that much of the post-targeted killing success stemmed from a substantial increase in the rate of suicide attacks directed against soft (as opposed to hard) targets (see Figure 7). Consider that 11 of the 13 known targets of suicide bombers before Dadullah's elimination were hard targets (ISAF/NATO, ANA, ANP, and Private Security Guards (PSG)). After his killing, known hard target selection dropped sharply. In fact, no suicide bomber targeted ANA or ANP forces specifically following Dadullah's elimination (although these forces had been the favored target before his death). Instead, after Dadullah's killing, well over half of all known targets of suicide bombings were soft targets (international governments, Afghan officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and civilians). 77 In all likelihood, it is this shift in target selection that accounts for changing rates in suicide bombing success and professionalism.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### ALSO RELEVANT TO T—CP Solves Ethical Engagement

#### Holding targeted killing to stringent standards activates our personal responsibility to make democratic leaders accountable.

Richard **BELLAMY** Poli Sci @ University College (London) **’10** “Dirty hands and clean gloves: Liberal ideals and real politics” *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 p.427

A study of the dirtiness of politics cannot end cleanly. There are no clean political decisions. Wolves and traps abound, not only because some people are wicked but also because most public issues are complicated and contested. They can only be resolved through force and persuasion. Thus, the role of a politician does not afford them the luxury of being good in a manner appropriate to many private roles. The good politician must do things even the good citizen would not. Likewise, a liberal idealism built on our **duties as persons**, **beyond any role**, **proves a chimera**. Nor can we clean up politics with a sui generis political morality based on distinctively public as opposed to private reasons. Our public reasons differ and not all can be accommodated, while wolves lurk and traps abound to ensnare the good politician as he or she attempts to uphold the common welfare. So politicians must act as foxes and keep certain things hidden. They must appear to be good, but know how not to be. Liberal idealism offers a clean glove of legitimacy, but not a clear guide to what is right and good. Unjust settlements can also gain a spurious justification when liberal norms of equality get applied to unequal circumstances. Yet keeping some faith with liberal democratic ideals reminds politicians of the need to act proportionally and with popular support. Appearing to be good offers an incentive to attempt to be so. However, no public measure exists to mark where politicians overstep the line beyond their ability to convince the public they have succeeded. In a democracy, **citizens share in the dirt** of their politicians but – hypocritically perhaps – **also offer the only means to keep it as clean** as their good – the **good of the public** – can ever allow it to be.

#### Take responsibility by deliberating and taking public accountability—encourages transparency and accountability

#### CP provides grounds for ethical decisions, but acknowledges that targeted killing involve

#### es lesser evils not moral absolutes.

Peter **PHAM** Director of the Atlantic Council's Africa Center **‘4** “Law, Human Rights, Realism and the “War on Terror”” *Human Rights and Human Welfare* V. 4 p. 103-104

In the current debate, what is needed is a recovery of the realistic Hobbesian viewpoint: one ought not construct **abstract ethical systems** that are out of line with the human moral and political capacities and the circumstances of war. For Hobbes, a primary condition of any ethic is that individuals and groups be able consistently to follow it. Otherwise, such laws threaten obsolescence because they have little or no relationship to social realities, and are thus unreasonable (see Kavka 1986: 29-83). This realist vision does not so much hold that individuals and states should ignore the demands of morality when placed in extreme situations. Rather they redefine those demands so that individuals and groups, including states, have an affirmative right to take extreme measures in self-defense of the basic foundation for human existence: physical security itself. As Robert Jackson affirms, “the laws and ethics of war are only realistic to the extent that they are within the moral reach of average people in their concrete circumstances” (Jackson 2000: 218). Standards of conduct tailored to saints have no place in war and peace—or any other human endeavor for that matter. On the other hand, neither should standards be set too low, lest one is swept into the whirlpool of la politique du pire. There is a slippery slope descending from civilization—governed by laws and valuing human dignity—to barbarism—governed by passions and valuing nothing. Consequently, as Ignatieff argues convincingly, it is the **procedural requirements** and **prudential maxims** of a democratic polity that point the way to a possible resolution, one that is desperately needed if free societies are to continue confronting “an enemy whose demands cannot be appeased, who cannot be deterred, and who does not have to win in order for us to lose” (153). After all, as Walter Laqueur concluded somberly at the end of his study on the future of terrorism, there is little likelihood that the threat will diminish in the foreseeable future: Even in the unlikely case that all global conflicts will be resolved—that all political, social, and economic tensions of this world will vanish—this will not necessarily be the end of terrorism. The combination of paranoia, fanaticism, and extremist political (or religious) doctrine will find new outlets. It is the reservoir from which the terrorism of today and tomorrow attracts its followers. Perhaps it is not part of the human condition, but it certainly is part of the condition of certain sections and individuals. There are bound to be ups and downs as far as the frequency and the political impact of terrorism is concerned. But there is a huge reservoir of aggression, and for this reason terrorism will be with us as far as one can look ahead (Laqueur 2003: 231). But if the fate of free societies is to be perpetually tested in the forge of unrelenting, asymmetrical, non-reciprocal warfare, then Ignatieff’s counsels are indeed prudent, even if his specific policy prescriptions are contestable. A “lesser evil” approach to ethics permits the necessary flexibility that the circumstances of the war on terror require—including, perhaps including among other difficult choices, prolonged preventative detention, aggressive interrogation, preemptive strikes and targeted killings—while the **vigorous scrutiny** of the **adversarial process** in democratic polities can keep flexibility from becoming license. As the Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged in summarizing its ruling outlawing Shin Bet’s interrogation techniques: This decision opens with a description of the difficult reality in which Israel finds herself security wise. We shall conclude this judgment by readdressing that harsh reality. We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with that reality. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties. (Supreme Court of Israel 1999: 1489). However, if it is to successfully steer the realistic middle course between an absolutist human rights/civil liberties position that does not accept that rights violations can ever be justified, and an equally purist consequentialist position that judges actions solely on their effectiveness, this process must be driven by truth rather than lies, openness rather than denial. Policy mechanisms must be artfully constructed with procedural safeguards including, for example, independent review of detentions, clearly delineated parameters for interrogation, and well-understood strategic goals and accountability for preemptive actions. In his dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hamdi decision (one in which he was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens), Justice Antonin Scalia professed that it was beyond his competence to know which “tools are sufficient to meet the government’s security needs, including the need to obtain intelligence through interrogation.” He nonetheless asserted, “[i]f civil liberties are to be curtailed during war time, it must be done openly and democratically, as the Constitution requires, rather than by silent erosion.” Of course, the democratic process, no matter how open or inclusive, offers no guarantees concerning the virtue or even justice of its public policy choices: after all, choices, even erroneous ones, as well as their attendant consequences are unavoidable elements of the human experience. However, while the adversarial dynamics of democratic proceedings are fallible, they do allow for the possibility of correcting errors. Consequently, in democratic societies, it is always preferable to decide controversial issues after open debate and due deliberation, rather than to make them hastily when impassioned and under duress. This is especially true where the choice that has to be made is tragic: balancing liberty with security.

### 2NC Impact Overview

#### Stability isn’t about perfection. Trying to achieve social peace is about preventing violent anarchy.

Elshtain 3—Jean Bethke, Prof. Social and Pol. Ethics—U. Chicago [“Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World,” p. 48-49]

Many, myself included, believe that Hobbes overstated his case. But there is a powerful element of truth in his depiction of the state of nature. Without civic peace—a basic framework of settled law and simple, everyday order—human life descends to its most primitive level. By primitive I mean rudimentary, the bare minimum—we struggle just to stay alive. The face of such worlds is known to us. We saw it in Somalia under the warlords. We saw it under the Taliban in Afghanistan, where horrible disorder prevailed in the name of order. When government becomes destructive of the most basic end for which it is instituted, tranquillitas ordinis, it abandons its minimal raison d'être and can no longer be said to be legitimate. This assumption is essential to political theory. All political theories begin with a notion of how to establish and sustain order among human beings. Some go beyond this minimal requirement to ask how human beings can work to attain justice, or serve the common good, or preserve and protect political liberty. But none of these other ends can be served without basic order. George Weigel defines tranquillitas ordinis as "the peace of public order in dynamic political community," insisting that there is nothing static about "the concept of tranquillitas ordinis as it evolved after Augustine." 3 The primary reason for the state's existence is to create those minimal conditions that prevent the worst from happening—meaning, the worst that human beings can do to one another. How do we prevent people from devouring one another like fishes, as Augustine put it? This task is in the first instance one of interdiction: preempting horrible things before they occur. Not all misfortune, catastrophe, or crime can be prevented. What Augustine calls "corking anxieties" are part of the human condition. But we can try to eliminate as many of the conditions that give rise to catastrophe as possible. We can refuse to tolerate violent crime and arbitrary, chaotic disorder. It is horrific to stand in the ruins of a once flourishing city or a section of a city and to know that a government could not prevent what happened there—or was, even worse, the agent of destruction. Imagine such horror as a daily occurrence. If this were our circumstance, we would rightly seek the restoration of basic, minimally decent civic peace and order. And we would rightly ask: Could none of this have been prevented? Is the government somehow responsible for the chaos and destruction? If our answer to the former question is yes, we are likely to call for a new government.

#### Existence is a prerequisite to value

**Wapner ‘3** (Paul, Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env’t. Policy Prog. – American U., Dissent, “Leftist criticism of “nature””, Winter, 50:1, Proquest)

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean Francois Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

### 2NC TK Good—Terrorism

#### Finish card

#### Targeted killings reduce the efficacy of attacks and overall professionalism of terrorist organizations—prefer ev which empirically compares different types of violence

Wilner 10—Alex S. Wilner is a post-doctoral fellow with the Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellowship for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) and a visiting scholar with the Center for Security Studies, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and the RAND Corporation [“Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 33, Issue 4, 2010, Taylor & Francis, Accessed through Emory Libraries]

Overall levels of violence, however, are only a minor part of the analysis. The data also reveal changes in Taliban professionalism following the targeted killings. For the two most sophisticated forms of violence (IEDs and suicide attacks), the aggregate data suggest a decrease in professionalism and an increase in failure rates. After the eliminations, IED failure rates rose precipitously from 20 to roughly 35 percent. This is a considerable change in proficiency. Suicide bombing success rates also dropped (by a less impressive though no less important five percentage points) following the strikes. Both are theoretically expected findings (Figure 3). Finally, the data also suggest that the targeted killings influenced the selection of targets. For instance, in terms of known target selection for suicide bombers, the aggregate data reveal that following the eliminations, soft targets were more often selected (as a percentage of all target selection) after the leadership strikes (Figure 4). As leaders where killed, remaining forces selected less formidable targets to attack, like Afghan government officials, civil-society actors, and off-duty police commanders, rather than hardened, military actors.

Target selection of small arms fire taken from the Dadullah case in particular illustrates a similar shift in target selection: SA/R attacks against Afghan National Police forces jumped from 24 percent of total recorded attacks before Dadullah's elimination, to roughly 40 percent afterward (Figure 5). Part of the reason may rest with the fact that of all armed groups working in Afghanistan, ANP forces are the easiest to attack successfully. Although armed and numbering in the tens of thousands, ANP forces lack the sophistication and training to properly contend with heavily armed insurgents. What is more, lightly manned and far-flung ANP checkpoints dot the Afghan landscape and offer a fixed (and under-protected) position for Taliban fire. For militants, attacking the ANP is easy to do and allows them to reaffirm their continued antagonism against the GoA and ISAF while suffering fewer losses. This would have been a particularly important message to demonstrate after their fiercest leader was slain.

Accordingly, accurately interpreting success rates requires a better appreciation for what type of actor is targeted specifically and with what particular form of violence. As a general rule, the softer the target the more success a group is likely to have. Following Dadullah's elimination, for example, more suicide attacks took place after his death than before, and their overall success rate seemed to augment considerably. Before his death, over half of all suicide attacks failed, while after his elimination, only one-third did (see Figure 6). On the surface, this is a momentous increase in professionalism and might lead one to conclude that Dadullah's removal had a positive rather than negative effect on suicide bombing rates and successes. What these figures fail to reveal, however, is that much of the post-targeted killing success stemmed from a substantial increase in the rate of suicide attacks directed against soft (as opposed to hard) targets (see Figure 7). Consider that 11 of the 13 known targets of suicide bombers before Dadullah's elimination were hard targets (ISAF/NATO, ANA, ANP, and Private Security Guards (PSG)). After his killing, known hard target selection dropped sharply. In fact, no suicide bomber targeted ANA or ANP forces specifically following Dadullah's elimination (although these forces had been the favored target before his death). Instead, after Dadullah's killing, well over half of all known targets of suicide bombings were soft targets (international governments, Afghan officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and civilians). 77 In all likelihood, it is this shift in target selection that accounts for changing rates in suicide bombing success and professionalism.

#### Future terror attacks cause XTC- increasing tech and lack of effective US response

Myhrvold 13—Nathan Myhrvold, PhD in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation [July 2013, “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf]

Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This fact, of course, has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got swords and battle-axes as well as scythes and awls. Every technology has violent applications because that is one of the first things we humans ask of our tools. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than—those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, now have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is perfectly feasible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. Worries about the future of the human race are hardly novel. Indeed, the notion that terrorists or others might use weapons of mass destruction is so commonplace as to be almost passé. Spy novels, movies, and television dramas explore this plot frequently. We have become desensitized to this entire genre, in part because James Bond always manages to save the world in the end. Reality may be different. In my estimation, the U.S. government, although well-meaning, is unable to protect us from the greatest threats we face. The other nations of the world are also utterly unprepared. Even obvious and simple steps are not being taken. The gap between what is necessary and what is being contemplated, much less being done, is staggering. My appraisal of the present situation does not discount the enormous efforts of many brave men and women in law enforcement, intelligence services, and the military. These people are doing what they can, but the resources that we commit to defense and the gathering of intelligence are mostly squandered on problems that are far less dangerous to the American public than the ones we are ignoring. Addressing the issue in a meaningful way will ultimately require large structural changes in many parts of the government. So far, however, our political leaders have had neither the vision to see the enormity of the problem nor the will to combat it. These weaknesses are not surprising: bureaucracies change only under extreme duress. And despite what some may say, the shocking attacks of September 11th, 2001, have not served as a wake-up call to get serious. Given the meager response to that assault, every reason exists to believe that sometime in the next few decades America will be attacked on a scale that will make 9/11 look trivial by comparison.

### AT: Civilian Casualties (Generic)

#### Civilian casualty claims are overstated and rapidly declining—best research proves

Cohen 13—Michael A Cohen, regular columnist for the Guardian and Observer on US politics, he is also a fellow of the Century Foundation [May 23, 2013, “Give President Obama a chance: there is a role for drones,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/23/obama-drone-speech-use-justified]

Drone critics have a much different take. They are passionate in their conviction that US drones are indiscriminately killing and terrorizing civilians. The Guardian's own Glenn Greenwald argued recently that no "minimally rational person" can defend "Obama's drone kills on the ground that they are killing The Terrorists or that civilian deaths are rare". Conor Friedersdorf, an editor at the Atlantic and a vocal drone critic, wrote last year that liberals should not vote for President Obama's re-election because of the drone campaign, which he claimed "kills hundreds of innocents, including children," "terrorizes innocent Pakistanis on an almost daily basis" and "makes their lives into a nightmare worthy of dystopian novels".

I disagree. Increasingly it appears that arguments like Friedersdorf makes are no longer sustainable (and there's real question if they ever were). Not only have drone strikes decreased, but so too have the number of civilians killed—and dramatically so.

This conclusion comes not from Obama administration apologists but rather, Chris Woods, whose research has served as the empirical basis for the harshest attacks on the Obama Administration's drone policy.

Woods heads the covert war program for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), which maintains one of three major databases tabulating civilian casualties from US drone strikes. The others are the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation (full disclosure: I used to be a fellow there). While LWJ and NAJ estimate that drone strikes in Pakistan have killed somewhere between 140 and 300 civilians, TBIJ utilizes a far broader classification for civilians killed, resulting in estimates of somewhere between 411-884 civilians killed by drones in Pakistan. The wide range of numbers here speaks to the extraordinary challenge in tabulating civilian death rates.

There is little local reporting done on the ground in northwest Pakistan, which is the epicenter of the US drone program. As a result data collection is reliant on Pakistani news reporting, which is also dependent on Pakistani intelligence, which has a vested interest in playing up the negative consequences of US drones.

When I spoke with Woods last month, he said that a fairly clear pattern has emerged over the past year—far fewer civilians are dying from drones. "For those who are opposed to drone strikes," says Woods there is historical merit to the charge of significant civilian deaths, "but from a contemporary standpoint the numbers just aren't there."

While Woods makes clear that one has to be "cautious" on any estimates of casualties, it's not just a numeric decline that is being seen, but rather it's a "proportionate decline". In other words, the percentage of civilians dying in drone strikes is also falling, which suggests to Woods that US drone operators are showing far greater care in trying to limit collateral damage.

Woods estimates are supported by the aforementioned databases. In Pakistan, New America Foundation claims there have been no civilian deaths this year and only five last year; Long War Journal reported four deaths in 2012 and 11 so far in 2013; and TBIJ reports a range of 7-42 in 2012 and 0-4 in 2013. In addition, the drop in casualty figures is occurring not just in Pakistan but also in Yemen.

These numbers are broadly consistent with what has been an under-reported decline in drone use overall. According to TBIJ, the number of drone strikes went from 128 in 2010 to 48 in 2012 and only 12 have occurred this year. These statistics are broadly consistent with LWJ and NAF's reporting. In Yemen, while drone attacks picked up in 2012, they have slowed dramatically this year. And in Somalia there has been no strike reported for more than a year.

Ironically, these numbers are in line with the public statements of CIA director Brennan, and even more so with Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, who claimed in February that the numbers she has received from the Obama administration suggest that the typical number of victims per year from drone attacks is in "the single digits".

Part of the reason for these low counts is that the Obama administration has sought to minimize the number of civilian casualties through what can best be described as "creative bookkeeping". The administration counts all military-age males as possible combatants unless they have information (posthumously provided) that proves them innocent. Few have taken the White House's side on this issue (and for good reason) though some outside researchers concur with the administration's estimates.

Christine Fair, a professor at Georgetown University has long maintained that civilian deaths from drones in Pakistan are dramatically overstated. She argues that considering the alternatives of sending in the Pakistani military or using manned aircraft to flush out jihadists, drone strikes are a far more humane method of war-fighting.

### AT: Inaccurate

#### Drones strikes are increasingly accurate and don’t piss off senior Pakistani officials

McCrisken 13—Trevor McCrisken is an Associate Professor in Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, and Chair of the British American Security Information Council, an independent organisation focused on encouraging sustainable transatlantic security policies [“Obama's Drone War,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 55, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor & Francis, Accessed through Emory Libraries]

According to the New America Foundation's analysis of drone attacks in Pakistan, however, civilian casualties per strike have fallen dramatically as the accuracy of the drone attacks has been improved by ‘increased numbers of US spies in Pakistan's tribal areas, better targeting, more intelligence cooperation with the Pakistani military, and smaller missiles’. The study shows that ‘the non-militant fatality rate since 2004 is approximately 25%, and in 2010, the figure has been more like 6%’. This suggests that disseminating accurate information on civilian casualties in Pakistan would make the programme of targeted killings more popular.40 Cameron Munter, former US Ambassador to Pakistan, supported the drone attacks as highly effective at countering al-Qaeda, but agreed that the secrecy surrounding the programme damaged the image of the United States in Pakistan. He argued that

if we were able to lift the veil on the program and talk more openly about what our goals are and how those goals coincide with those of people of good will in Pakistan, I think it could have a very positive effect.41

Official Pakistani sources have not dispelled the belief that civilians suffer greatly from drone attacks. For example, Pakistani government officials estimated that drone strikes caused around 700 civilian deaths in 2009, while an anonymous US official suggested that ‘just over 20’ of those killed were civilians.42 However, there is evidence that prominent figures in the Pakistani government privately favour the use of drones. In a leaked cable detailing a conversation with US Ambassador Anne Patterson from August 2008, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said of the strikes: ‘I don't care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We'll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.’43 President Asif Ali Zardari has also given his support privately, stating: ‘Kill the seniors. Collateral damage worries you Americans. It does not worry me.’44 Munter may therefore be correct in arguing that ‘the impact of the program has come to a point where it is time for the American authorities and the Pakistani authorities to have a much more open discussion’.45

### AT: Terrorist Backlash DA

#### Backlash doesn’t outweigh the benefits of drone war

Anderson 13—Kenneth, Professor of International Law at American University [May 24, 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary Magazine, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548.html]

4. Blowback

The most prominent critique today, however, is that drone warfare is counterproductive because it produces “blowback.” What is blowback?

Blowback comprises the supposed bad consequences of drones that swamp the benefits, if any, of drone warfare itself—the anger of villagers whose civilian relatives have been killed, for instance, or the resentment among larger populations in Pakistan or Yemen over drone strikes. The anger, we are told, is fanned by Islamist preachers, local media, and global Web communities, and then goes global in the ummah about the perceived targeting of Muslims and Islam. This leads to radicalization and membership recruitment where the strikes take place. Or maybe it leads to independently organized violence—perhaps the case of the Boston bombers, though it is too early to say. All this bad public perception outweighs whatever tactical value, if any, drone strikes might have.

Blowback can never be dismissed, because it might be true in some cases. But even when true, it would exist as a matter of degree, to be set against the benefits of the drone strikes themselves. By definition, blowback is a second-order effect, and its diffuse nature makes its existence more a matter of subjective judgment than any other evaluation of drone warfare. As a hypothesis, the possibility of blowback arises in two distinct settings: “narrow” counterinsurgency and “broad” global counterterrorism.

The narrow blowback hypothesis concerns those in communities directly affected by global counterterrorism drone strikes while the United States is trying to carry out a ground-level counterinsurgency campaign. The question is whether civilians, women and children especially, are being killed by drones in such numbers—because collateral damage is a fact, including from drone strikes—that they make these local communities even more fertile ground for anti-American operations. Do the drone strikes make things unacceptably more difficult for ground forces attempting to carry out a hearts-and-minds campaign to win over the local population?

Direct and immediate concerns about villagers’ perceptions during the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan led, at some points, to extraordinary (from the standpoint of lawful targeting and acceptable collateral damage) measures against using air power and even infantry to fire back at insurgents. But local counterinsurgency is not the long-term concern today; global counterterrorism is. Village-level resentments fueling recruitment might be a concern, but this type of blowback matters far less in terms of war fighting when the United States no longer has infantry in those places (and is no longer making its counterterrorism policy rest upon the chimera of a stable, democratic Afghanistan).

It is sharply contested, to say the least, whether and to what extent drone strikes are creating blowback among villagers, or whether and to what extent, as a former British soldier recently returned from Afghanistan remarked to me, villagers are sad to see the Taliban commander who just insisted on marrying someone’s young daughter blown up in an airstrike. There is also debate about the degree to which villagers are aware that the American drones are undertaking strikes that the Pakistani government might otherwise undertake. Critics often neglect to focus on the Pakistani government’s regular and brutal assaults in the tribal zones. Despite a general perception that all of Pakistan is united against drone strikes, voices in the Pakistani newspapers have often made note that the tribal areas fear the Pakistani army far more than they fear U.S. drones, because, despite mistakes and inevitable civilian casualties, they see them as smaller and more precise. But the blunt reality is that as the counterinsurgency era ends for U.S. forces, narrow blowback concerns about whether villages might be sufficiently provoked against American infantry are subsiding.

#### They overstate local backlash—alternatives are worse

Byman 13—Daniel Byman is a Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution [“Why Drones Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92 Issue 4, p. 32-43, EBSCO]

Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as SEAL team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

### AT: No Nuke Terrorism

#### Their take-outs are wrong—the motivation and technical capability exist—acquisition is the only barrier. Only a risk terrorists will steal it through transnational smuggling.

Bunn 10— Associate Professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Senior Research Associate, Managing the Atom Project [April, 2010, Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010,” http://www.nti.org/e\_research/Securing\_The\_Bomb\_2010.pdf]

Complacency about the threat is perhaps the biggest obstacle to forging the urgent, in-depth international cooperation needed to secure nuclear stockpiles and reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism. Many policymakers around the world continue to believe that it would take a Manhattan Project to make a nuclear bomb, that it would be almost impossible for terrorists to get the necessary nuclear material, and that the risk of terrorists getting and using a nuclear bomb is therefore vanishingly small. The experience of finding that Iraq did not have nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in 2003 has made many justifiably skeptical of other assertions about serious threats from such weapons. Unfortunately, while no one can say precisely what the probability of nuclear terrorism is, the danger is very real. Several unfortunate facts shape the risk the world faces.

Some Terrorists are Seeking Nuclear Weapons

Most terrorist groups are focused on small-scale violence to attain local objectives. For them, the old adage that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” holds true, and nuclear weapons are likely to be irrelevant or counterproductive for their goals. But a small set of terrorists with global ambitions and nihilistic visions clearly are eager to get and use a nuclear bomb. Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction a “religious duty.” 1

For years, al Qaeda operatives have repeatedly expressed the desire to inflict a “Hiroshima” on the United States. 2 Al Qaeda operatives have made repeated attempts to buy nuclear material for a nuclear bomb, or to recruit nuclear expertise.

Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, for example, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri met with two senior Pakistani nuclear scientists to discuss nuclear weapons. 3 Former CIA Director George Tenet reports that the two provided al Qaeda with a rough sketch of a nuclear bomb design, and that U.S. officials were so concerned about the activities of the “charity” they had established (whose board of directors also included a range of senior retired military officers, and which reportedly also offered nuclear weapons help to Libya) that President Bush directed him to fly to Pakistan and discuss the matter directly with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. 4 Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmoud, the more senior of the two, had long argued that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons rightfully belonged to the whole worldwide “ummah,” or Muslim community, and had advocated sharing nuclear weapons technology. 5

After the 9/11 attacks, intelligence agencies from the United States and other countries learned that in the years leading up to the attacks, al Qaeda had a focused nuclear weapons program managed by Abdel Aziz al-Masri (aka Ali Sayyid alBakri), an Egyptian explosives expert. The program reported directly to Zawahiri, as did al Qaeda’s anthrax efforts, its other major strategic-scale weapons of mass destruction program. This program reportedly got to the point of carrying out tests of conventional explosives for use in a nuclear bomb. 6

Al Qaeda’s nuclear efforts apparently continued after the disruptions the group faced following the overthrow of the Taliban government and the removal of al Qaeda’s Afghan sanctuary. In 2002-2003, U.S. intelligence received a “stream of reliable reporting” that the leadership of al Qaeda’s cell in Saudi Arabia was negotiating to purchase three objects they believed to be Russian “nuclear devices,” and that al Qaeda’s central leadership had approved the purchase if a Pakistani expert using his equipment confirmed that they were genuine. (The actual nature of these “devices,” if they existed, the name of the Pakistani expert, and the type of equipment he was to use to examine the devices have never been learned.) 7 At the same time these discussions were taking place, bin Laden arranged for a radical Saudi cleric to issue a fatwa or religious ruling authorizing the use of nuclear weapons against American civilians. 8 The cleric who issued the fatwa was the “steady companion” of the al Qaeda operative leading the negotiations over the nuclear devices. 9

Before al Qaeda, the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo also made a concerted effort to get nuclear weapons. 10 Chechen terrorists have certainly pursued the possibility of a radioactive “dirty bomb,” and there are at least suggestive indications that they also have pursued nuclear weapons—including two incidents of terrorists conducting reconnaissance at secret nuclear weapon storage sites, confirmed by Russian officials. There are at least some indications that Pakistani groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba may also be interested—a particularly troubling possibility given the deep past connections these groups have had with Pakistani security services, their ongoing cooperation with al Qaeda, and the example of in-depth cooperation on unconventional weapons provided by al Qaeda’s work with Jemaah Islamiyah on anthrax. 11

With at least two groups going down this path in the last 15 years, and possibly more, there is no reason to expect that others will not do so in the future.

Some Terrorist Groups might be able to make Crude Nuclear Bombs

Repeated assessments by the U.S. government and other governments have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude nuclear explosive—capable of destroying the heart of a major city—if they got enough plutonium or HEU. A “gun-type” bomb made from HEU, in particular, is basically a matter of slamming two pieces of HEU together at high speed. An “implosion-type” bomb—in which precisely arranged explosives crush nuclear material to a much higher density, setting off the chain reaction—would be substantially more difficult for terrorists to accomplish, but is still plausible, particularly if they got knowledgeable help (as they have been actively attempting to do). 12

One study by the now-defunct congressional Office of Technology Assessment summarized the technical reality: “A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device... Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required.” 13 Indeed, even before the revelations from Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence concluded that “fabrication of at least a ‘crude’ nuclear device was within al-Qa’ida’s capabilities, if it could obtain fissile material.” 14

It is important to understand that making a crude, unsafe, unreliable bomb of uncertain yield that might be carried in the back of a large van is a dramatically simpler task than designing and building a safe, secure, reliable, and efficient weapon deliverable by a ballistic missile, which a state might want to incorporate into its arsenal. Terrorists are highly unlikely to ever be able to make a sophisticated and efficient weapon, a task that requires a substantial nuclear weapons enterprise— but they may well be able to make a crude one. Their task would be easier if they managed to recruit experts with experience in key aspects of a national nuclear weapons program. Nuclear weapons themselves generally have substantial security measures and would be more difficult to steal than nuclear materials. If terrorists nevertheless managed to steal an assembled nuclear weapon from a state, there is a significant risk that they might figure out how to set it off—though this, too, would in most cases be a difficult challenge for a terrorist group. 15 Many modern U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are equipped with sophisticated electronic locks, known in the United States as “permissive action links” or PALs, intended to make it difficult to detonate the weapon without inserting an authorized code, which terrorists might find very difficult to bypass. Some weapons, however, are either not equipped with PALs or are equipped with older versions that lack some of the highestsecurity features (such as “limited try” features that would permanently disable the weapon if the wrong code is inserted too many times or attempts are made to bypass the lock). 16 Many nuclear weapons also have safety features designed to prevent the weapon from detonating unless it had gone through its expected flight to its target—such as intense acceleration followed by unpowered flight for a ballistic missile warhead—and these would also have to be bypassed, if they were present, for terrorists to be able to make use of an assembled nuclear weapon they acquired.

If they could not figure out how to detonate a stolen weapon, terrorists might choose to remove its nuclear material and fashion a new bomb. Some modern, highly efficient designs might not contain enough material for a crude, inefficient terrorist bomb; but multistage thermonuclear weapons, with nuclear material in both the “primary” (the fission bomb that sets off the fusion reaction) and the “secondary” (where the fusion takes place) probably would provide sufficient material. In any case, terrorists in possession of a stolen nuclear weapon would be in a position to make fearsome threats, for no one would know for sure whether they could set it off.

## \*\*\* 1NR

### 2NC—Fairness O/W Edu

#### Turn—Rules are key to fun.

Prensky 1—Marc Prensky, Internationally acclaimed speaker, writer, consultant, and designer in the critical areas of education and learning, Founder, CEO and Creative Director of games2train.com, former vice president at the global financial firm Bankers Trust, BA from Oberlin College, an MBA from Harvard Business School with distinction and master's degrees from Middlebury and Yale [“Fun, Play and Games: What Makes Games Engaging,” Digital Game-Based Learning, www.marcprensky.com/writing/Prensky%20-%20Digital%20Game-Based%20Learning-Ch5.pdf]

So fun — in the sense of enjoyment and pleasure — puts us in a relaxed, receptive frame of mind for learning. Play, in addition to providing pleasure, increases our involvement, which also helps us learn. Both “fun” and “play” however, have the disadvantage of being somewhat abstract, unstructured, and hard-to-define concepts. But there exists a more formal and structured way to harness (and unleash) all the power of fun and play in the learning process — the powerful institution of games. Before we look specifically at how we can combine games with learning, let us examine games themselves in some detail. Like fun and play, game is a word of many meanings and implications. How can we define a game? Is there any useful distinction between fun, play and games? What makes games engaging? How do we design them? Games are a subset of both play and fun. In programming jargon they are a “child”, inheriting all the characteristics of the “parents.” They therefore carry both the good and the bad of both terms. Games, as we will see, also have some special qualities, which make them particularly appropriate and well suited for learning. So what is a game? Like play, game, has a wide variety of meanings, some positive, some negative. On the negative side there is mocking and jesting, illegal and shady activity such as a con game, as well as the “fun and games” that we saw earlier. As noted, these can be sources of resistance to Digital Game-Based Learning — “we are not playing games here.” But much of that is semantic. What we are interested in here are the meanings that revolve around the definition of games involving rules, contest, rivalry and struggle. What Makes a Game a Game? Six Structural Factors The Encyclopedia Britannica provides the following diagram of the relation between play and games: 35 PLAY spontaneous play organized play (GAMES) noncompetitive games competitive games (CONTESTS) intellectual contests physical contests (SPORTS) Our goal here is to understand why games engage us, drawing us in often in spite of ourselves. This powerful force stems first from the fact that they are a form of fun and play, and second from what I call the six key structural elements of games: 1. Rules 2. Goals and Objectives 3. Outcomes & Feedback 4. Conflict/Competition/Challenge/Opposition 5. Interaction, and 6. Representation or Story. There are thousands, perhaps millions of different games, but all contain most, if not all, these powerful factors. Those that don’t contain all the factors are still classified as games by many, but can also belong to other subclasses described below. In addition to these structural factors, there are also important design elements that add to engagement and distinguish a really good game from a poor or mediocre one. Let us discuss these six factors in detail and show how and why they lead to such strong engagement. Rules are what differentiate games from other kinds of play. Probably the most basic definition of a game is that it is organized play, that is to say rule-based. If you don’t have rules you have free play, not a game. Why are rules so important to games? Rules impose limits – they force us to take specific paths to reach goals and ensure that all players take the same paths. They put us inside the game world, by letting us know what is in and out of bounds. What spoils a game is not so much the cheater, who accepts the rules but doesn’t play by them (we can deal with him or her) but the nihilist, who denies them altogether. Rules make things both fair and exciting. When the Australians “bent” the rules of the America’s Cup and built a huge boat in 1988, and the Americans found a way to compete with a catamaran, it was still a race — but no longer the same game.

#### And, Fun is key to education and knowledge retention.

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So what is the relationship between fun and learning? Does having fun help or hurt? Let us look at what some researchers have to say on the subject: “Enjoyment and fun as part of the learning process are important when learning new tools since the learner is relaxed and motivated and therefore more willing to learn.”6 "The role that fun plays with regard to intrinsic motivation in education is twofold. First, intrinsic motivation promotes the desire for recurrence of the experience… Secondly, fun can motivate learners to engage themselves in activities with which they have little or no previous experience." 7 "In simple terms a brain enjoying itself is functioning more efficiently." 8 "When we enjoy learning, we learn better" 9 Fun has also been shown by Datillo & Kleiber, 1993; Hastie, 1994; Middleton, Littlefield & Lehrer, 1992, to increase motivation for learners. 10 It appears then that the principal roles of fun in the learning process are to create relaxation and motivation. Relaxation enables a learner to take things in more easily, and motivation enables them to put forth effort without resentment.

#### a. Unpredictability causes shallow and generic debates—these are less valuable than strategies tailored to specific affirmatives. It makes it impossible to neutrally evaluate their arguments because there are no shared rules—they make the competition bankrupt—that’s above.

#### b. Prevents rigorous testing—we need to research and isolate weaknesses of the aff.

Zappen 4—James Zappen, Professor of Language and Literature at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute [“The Rebirth of Dialogue: Bakhtin, Socrates, and the Rhetorical Tradition,” p. 35-36]

Finally, Bakhtin describes the Socratic dialogue as a carnivalesque debate between opposing points of view, with a ritualistic crownings and decrownings of opponents. I call this Socratic form of debate a contesting of ideas to capture the double meaning of the Socratic debate as both a mutual testing of oneself and others and a contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives. Brickhouse and Smith explain that Socrates' testing of ideas and people is a mutual testing not only of others but also of himself: Socrates claims that he has been commanded by the god to examine himself as well as others; he claims that the unexamined life is not worth living; and, since he rarely submits to questioning himself, "it must be that in the process of examining others Socrates regards himself as examining his own life, too." Such a mutual testing of ideas provides the only claim to knowledge that Socrates can have: since neither he nor anyone else knows the real definitions of things, he cannot claim to have any knowledge of his own; since, however, he subjects his beliefs to repeated testing, he can claim to have that limited human knowledge supported by the "inductive evidence" of "previous elenctic examinations." This mutual testing of ideas and people is evident in the Laches and also appears in the Gorgias in Socrates' testing of his own belief that courage is inseparable from the other virtues and in his willingness to submit his belief and indeed his life to the ultimate test of divine judgment, in what Bakhtin calls a dialogue on the threshold. The contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives and their ritualistic crowning/decrowning is evident in the Gorgias in Soocrates' successive refutations and humiliations of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.